Meanwhile Pausanias son of Cleombrotus was sent out from Lacedaemon in command of the Hellenes with twenty ships from Peloponnesus, accompanied by thirty Athenian ships and a multitude of other allies.

 They nmade also an expedition against Cyprus, subduing most of it, and afterwards, at the time of Pausanias' leadership, besieged Byzantium, which the Persians then field, and took it.

 But, since he had already become headstrong, cf. Thuc. 1.130.2 . the rest of the Hellenes became disaffected, especially the Ionians and all who had been recently emancipated from the King.
 So they waited upon the Athenians and begged them in the name of their kinship As the mother city; cf. Thuc. 1.2 . (end). to become their leaders, and to resist Pausanias if he should attempt to coerce them. 478 B.C. 

 The Athenians accepted their proposals and gave full attention to the matter with the determination to endure Pausanias' conduct no longer and to settle all other matters as should seem best to themselves.

 Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians recalled Pausanias in order to interrogate him about reports they were hearing, for much wrongdoing was charged against him by the Hellenes who came to Sparta, and his behaviour seemed an aping of despotic power rather than the conduct of a general.


 
And it so happened that he was cited before the court at the very time that the allies in vexation at him had gone over to the side of the Athenians, all except the soldiers from the Peloponnesus.

 And although, on his return to Lacedaemon, Pausanias was held to account for any personal wrongs he had committed against individuals, yet on the principal charges he was acquitted of misconduct;
 for he was accused most of all of treasonable relations with the Persians, and it seemed to be a very clear case.

 And they did not again send him out as commander, but Dorcis, together with some others, with an inconsiderable force;
 but the allies did not entrust these with the chief command.

 And they, being now aware of the situation, went back home;
 and the Lacedaemonians sent out no other commanders thereafter, fearing that any who went out might be corrupted, as they saw had happened in the case of Pausanias;
 they also wanted to be rid of the Persian war, and thought that the Athenians were competent to take the leadership and were friendly to themselves at the time.

 After the Athenians had succeeded in this way to the leadership over the allies, who freely chose them on account of their hatred of Pausanias, they assessed the amount of their contributions, both for the states which were to furnish money for the war against the Barbarians and for those which were to furnish ships, the avowed object being to avenge themselves for what they had suffered by ravaging the King's territory.

 And it was then 476 B.C. that the Athenians first established the office of Hellenic treasurers, who received the tribute;
 for so the contribution of money was termed.
 The amount of the tribute first assessed was four hundred and sixty talents, and the treasury of the allies was Delos, where the meetings were held in the temple.

 Exercising then what was at first a leadership over allies who were autonomous and took part in tle deliberations of common assemblies, the Athenians, in the interval between this war and the Persian, undertook, both in war and in the administration of public affairs, the enterprises now to be related, which were directed against the Barbarian, against their own allies when they attempted revolution, and against such of the Peloponnesians as from time to time came into conflict with them in the course of each attempt.

 And I have made a digression to write of these matters for the reason that this period has been omitted by all my predecessors, wlo have confined their narratives either to Hellenic affairs before the Persian War or to the Persian War itself;
 and Hellanicus, the only one of these who has ever touched upon this period, has in his Attic History treated of it briefly, and with inaccuracy as regards his chronology.
 And at the same time the narrative of these events serves to explain how the empire of Athens was established.

 Iirst, then, under the leadership of Cimon son of Miltiades, they took by siege Eion on the Strymon, which the Persians held, and enslaved its inhabitants 476 B.C. ;

 then they enslaved Scyros, the island in the Aegean inhabited by Dolopians, and colonised it themselves.

 And a war arose between them and the Carystians, the other Euboeans taking no part in it, and after a time terms of capitulation were agreed upon.

 After this they waged war upon the Naxians, 466 B.C. who had revolted, and reduced them by siege.
 And this was the first allied city to be enslaved in violation of the established rule;
 but afterwards the others also were enslaved as it happened in each case.

 Now while there were other causes of revolts, the principal ones were the failures in bringing in the tribute or their quota of ships and, in some cases, refusal of military service;
 for the Athenians exacted the tribute strictly and gave offence by applying coercive measures to any who were unaccustomed or unwilling to bear the hardships of service.

 And in some other respects, too, the Athenians were no longer equally agreeable as leaders;
 they would not take part in expeditions on terms of equality, and they found it easy to reduce those who revolted.

 For all this the allies themselves were responsible;
 for most of them, on account of their aversion to military service, in order to avoid being away from home got themselves rated in sums of money instead of ships, which they should pay in as their proportionate contribution, and consequently the fleet of the Athenians was increased by the funds which they contributed, while they themselves, whenever they revolted, entered on the war without preparation and without experience.

 After this occurred at the river Eurymedon in Pamphylia the land-battle and sea-fight of the Athenians For this glorious victory of Cimon's, whose date (466 B.C.?) is not certain, cf. Diod. 11. 60 ; Plut. Cim. 12 and their allies against the Persians;
 and the Athenians were victorious in both on the same day under the command of Cimon son of Miltiades, and they took and destroyed triremes of the Phoenicians to the number of two hundred all told.

 And some time afterwards it came to pass that the Thasians revolted from them, 465 B.C. a quarrel having arisen about the trading posts and the mine The Thasians had a gold mine at Skapte Hyle on the Thracian coast, from which they drew rich revenues; cf. Hdt. 6.46 f. on the opposite coast of Thrace, of which the Thasians enjoyed the profits.
 Thereupon the Athenians sailed with their fleet against Thasos, and, after winning a battle at sea, disembarked on the island.

 About the same time they sent to the river Strymon ten thousand colonists, consisting of Athenians and their allies, with a view to colonising the place, then called Nine Ways, but now Amphipolis;
 and though these colonists gained possession of Nine Ways, which was inhabited by Edoni, yet when they advanced into the interior of Thrace they were destroyed at Drabescus in Edonia by the united forces of the Thracians, to whom the settlement of the place was a menace.

 As for the Thasians, who had been defeated in battle and were now besieged, they appealed to the Lacedaemonians and urged them to come to their aid by invading Attica.

 This, unknown to the Athenians, they promised to do, and intended to keep their promise, but were prevented by the earthquake Called "the great earthquake" in Thuc. 1.128.1 . which occurred at the time 464 B.C. when both their Helots and the Perioeci of Thuria and Aethaea revolted and went to Ithome. The Perioeci were the old inhabitants of the country, chiefly of Achaean stock, reduced to a condition of dependence, i.e. were not citizens, though not state—slaves as the Helots were. 
 Most of the Helots were the descendants of the early Messenians who had been enslaved of old, Referring to the mythical time of the first Messenian war. and hence were all called Messenians.

 The Lacedaemonians, then, were involved in war with the rebels on Ithome;
 and so the Thasians, who were in the third year of the siege, came to terms with the Athenians, pulling down their walls and delivering over their ships, agreeing to pay forthwith whatever sum of money should be required of them and to render tribute in future, and, finally, giving up both the mainland and the mine.

 The Lacedaemonians, on the other hand, when their war with the rebels on Ithome proved a long affair, appealed to their allies in general and especially to the Athenians, who came with a considerable force under the command of Cimon.

 The principal reason why an appeal was made to them was that they were reputed to be skilful in siege operations, whereas the long continuance of the siege showed their own deficiency in this respect;
 for otherwise they would have taken the place by assault.

 And it was in consequence of this expedition that a lack of harmony in the relations of the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians first became manifest.
 For the Lacedaemonians, when they failed to take the place by storm, fearing the audacity and the fickleness of the Athenians, whom they regarded, besides, as men of another race, thought that, if they remained, they might be persuaded by the rebels on Ithome to change sides;
 they therefore dismissed them, alone of the allies, without giving any indication of their suspicion, but merely saying that they had no further need of them.

 The Athenians, however, recognized that they were not being sent away on the more creditable ground, but because some suspicion had arisen;
 so because they felt indignant and considered that they had not deserved such treatment at the hands of the Lacedaemonians, the instant they returned home they gave up the alliance which they had made with the Lacedaemonians against the Persians and became allies of their enemies, the Argives.
 And an alliance at the same time, on the same terms and confirmed by the same oaths, was concluded by both the Athenians and the Argives with the Thessalians.

 In the tenth year 455 B.C. the rebels on Ithome found that they could hold out no longer and surrendered to the Lacedaemonians on condition that they should leave the Peloponnesus under a truce and should never set foot in it again;

 and if any of them should be caught there, he was to be a slave of his captor.

 Moreover, before this time the Lacedaemonians also received a Pythian oracle, which bade them let go the suppliant of Ithomean Zeus.
 So the Messenians left the Peloponnesus, themselves and their children and wives;
 and the Athenians received them, in consequence of the enmity to the Lacedaemonians already existing, and settled them at Naupactus, which they happened to have lately taken from its possessors, the Ozolian Locrians.

 And the Megarians also entered into alliance with the Athenians, revolting from the Lacedaemonians because the Corinthians were pressing them hard in a war about boundaries;
 and thus the Athenians secured Megara and Pegae, Pegae was the Megarian harbour on the Corinthian gulf: Nisaea, a nearer one, on the Saronic gulf. and they built for the Megarians the long walls which run from the city to Nisaea and held it with a garrison of their own troops.
 And it was chiefly because of this act that the vehement hatred of the Corinthians for the Athenians first arose.

 Meanwhile Inaros, son of Psammetichus, a Libyan and king of the Libyans who are adjacent to Egypt, setting out from Mareia, the city just north of Pharos, caused the greater part of Egypt to revolt from King Artaxerxes, 460 B.C. and then, when he had made himself ruler, he called in the Athenians.

 And they left Cyprus, cf. Thuc. 1.94.2 . where they happened to be on an expedition with two hundred ships of their own and of their allies, and went to Egypt, and when they had sailed up the Nile from the sea, finding themselves masters of the river and of twothirds of Memphis, they proceeded to attack the third part, which is called the White Fortress.
 And in this fortress were some Persians and Medes who had taken refuge there, and such Egyptians as had not joined in the revolt.

 The Athenians also made a descent with a fleet upon Halieis, where they had a battle with some Corinthians and Epidaurians, in which the Corinthians won.
 And afterwards the Athenians fought a sea-fight at Cecryphaleia with a Peloponnesian fleet, in which the Athenians won.

 After this war broke out between the Athenians and the Aeginetans, and a great sea-fight occurred between the Athenians and the Aeginetans off Aegina, in which the allies of both sides were present.
 This the Athenians won and having taken seventy Aeginetan ships they descended upon their territory and laid siege to the city, Leocrates son of Stroebus, being in command.

 Thereupon the Peloponnesians, wishing to aid the Aeginetans, sent into Aegina three hundred hoplites, who had previously been assisting the Corinthians and Epidaurians.
 Moreover, the Corinthians occupied the heights of Geraneia, and made a descent upon the territory of M egara in conjunction with their allies, thinking that the Athenians would be unable to aid the Megarians, since many of their troops were away in Aegina and in Egypt, or if they should attempt it that they would have to withdraw from Aegina.

 The Athenians, however, did not disturb the army besieging Aegina, but with such forces as were left in the city, consisting of the oldest and the youngest men, marched into Megara, the general in command being Myronides.

 An indecisive battle was fought with the Corinthians, whereupon they separated, each side thinking they had not got the worst of it in the action.

 And the Athenians, who had in fact got rather the better of it, when the Corinthians withdrew, set up a trophy;
 but the Corinthians, being reproached by the older men in their city, made their preparations and about twelve days later came back and set up for themselves a rival trophy, as though they had won.
 Hereupon the Athenians made a sally from Megara, slew those who were setting up the trophy, and joining battle with the rest defeated them.

 The vanquished party now retreated, and a not inconsiderable portion of them, being hard pressed, missed their way and rushed into a piece of land belonging to some private person, which was enclosed by a great ditch and had no exit.

 And when the Athenians perceived this, they shut them in by barring the entrance with hoplites, and stationing light-armed troops all round stoned all who had entered.
 And this was a great calamity to the Corinthians;
 the main body of their army, however, returned home.

 About this period 457 B.C. the Athenians began to build their long walls to the sea, one to Phalerum, the other to the Peiraeus.
 And the Phocians made an expedition against the land of the Dorians, the mother-country of the Lacedaemonians, namely the towns of Boeum, Citinium, and Erineum, one of which they captured;

 whereupon the Lacedaemonians, under the lead of Nicomedes son of Cleombrotus, acting for King Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, who was still a minor, sent to the aid of the Dorians a force of fifteen hundred hoplites of their own and ten thousand of their allies, and after they had forced the Phocians to make terms and restore the city they began their return homeward.

 Now if they wished to take the sea-route and make their passage by way of the Crisaean Gulf, the Athenians were sure to take their fleet round the Peloponnesus and block their way;
 and to march over the Geranaean pass appeared to them hazardous, since the Athenians held Megara and Pegae.
 Besides, the Geranaean pass was not easy to traverse and was at all times guarded by the Athenians, and at this present time, as the Lacedaemonians perceived, they intended to block their way.
 So they decided to wait in Boeotia and consider how they might most safely cross over to the Peloponnesus.

 To this course they were partly influenced by some Athenians, who were secretly inviting them into their country, in the hope of putting an end to the democracy and to the building of the long walls.

 But the Athenians went out against the Lacedaemonians with their whole force and with one thousand Argives and contingents of the several allies, the whole body amounting to fourteen thousand men.

 And they undertook the expedition against them because they believed that they were at a loss how to get through, and partly too on a suspicion of a plot to overthrow the democracy.

 The forces of the Athenians were strengthened by some Thessalian cavalry, who came in accordance with the terms of the alliance, but they deserted to the Lacedaemonians in the course of the action.

 The battle took place 456 B.C. at Tanagra in Boeotia, and in it the Lacedaemonians and their allies were victorious, and there was much slaughter on both sides.

 The Lacedaemonians then entered the Megaiian territory, cut down the trees, and went back home by way of Geraneia and the Isthmus.

 But on the sixty-second day after the battle, the Athenians, having made an expedition into Boeotia under Myronides, defeated the Boeotians at Oenophyta, got control of Boeotia and Phocis, pulled down the walls of Tanagra, and took one hundred of the wealthiest men of the Opuntian Locrians as hostages.

 Meanwhile they completed their own long walls.
 After this the Aeginetans also capitulated to the Athenians, pulling down their walls, delivering up their ships, and agreeing to pay tribute in future. 455 B.C. 

 And the Athenians, under the command of Tolmides son of Tolmaeus, sailed round the Peloponnesus, bullned the dock-yard Gytheum, on the Laconian gulf. of the Lacedaemonians, took Chalcis, a city of the Corinthians, and making a descent upon the territory of the Sicyonians defeated them in battle.

 Meanwhile the Athenians and their allies stayed on in Egypt and the war took on many forms.

 At first the Athenians had the mastery in Egypt, and the King sent to Lacedaemon Megabazus a Persian with a supply of money, in order that the Lacedaemonians might be induced to invade Attica and the Athenians thus be drawn away from Egypt.

 But when he found that matters did not advance and the money was being spent in vain, Megabazus betook himself back to Asia with the money that was left, and Megabyzus son of Zopyrus, Hero of the capture of Babylon, Hdt. 2.115 . a Persian, was despatched with a large army. Diodorus gives him with Artabazus 300,000 men ( 11.75 ) and 300 ships ( 11.77 ). 

 He marched thither by land, and defeated the Egyptians and their allies in battle, drove the Hellenes out of Memphis, and finally shut them up in the island of Prosopitis, where he besieged them for a year and six months, then finally, by diverting the water into another course, drained the canal and left the ships high and dry, converting the greater part of the island into mainland;
 then he crossed over dry-shod and took the island.

 Thus this undertaking of the Hellenes came to naught after a war of six years; 454 B.C. 
 and but few out of many, making their way through Libya into Cyrene, escaped with their lives;

 the most of them perished.
 And all Egypt again came under the King's dominion, except Amyrtaeus, the king of the marshes cf. Hdt. 2.140 ; 3. 15 . ;
 for the Persians were unable to capture him, both on account of the extent of the marsh and because the marsh people are the best fighters among the Egyptians.

 Inaros, however, the king of the Libyans, who had been the originator of the whole movement in Egypt, was taken by treachery and impaled.

 And when fifty triremes, which sailed to Egypt from Athens and the rest of the confederacy to relieve the fleet there, put in at the Mendesian mouth of the Nile, quite unaware of what had happened, the infantry fell upon them from the shore and a Phoenician fleet from the sea and destroyed most of the ships, a small number only escaping.
 So ended the great expedition against Egypt of the Athenians and their allies.

 And now Orestes son of Echecratidas, king of the Thessalians, who was exiled from Thessaly, persuaded the Athenians to restore him.
 And they, taking along some Boeotians and Phocians who were allies, made an expedition against Pharsalus in Thessaly.
 And though they made themselves masters of the land, so far as this was possible without going far from their camp—for the Thessalian cavalry hemmed them in—they failed to capture the city and indeed none of the other objects of their expedition was attained, so they went back home again unsuccessful, having Orestes with them.

 Not long after this 454 B.C. one thousand Athenians, embarking on the ships at Pegae, which was now in their possession, cf. Thuc. 1.103.4 . sailed along the coast to Sicyon under the command of Pericles son of Xanthippus, and disembarking defeated in battle the Sicyonians who came out against them.

 Immediately thereafter, taking along some Achaeans and sailing across the gulf, they made an expedition against Oeniadae in Acarnania and laid siege to it;
 but failing to take it they went back home.

 Three years afterwards 451 B.C. a truce was made between the Peloponnesians and Athenians, to last five years.

 And the Athenians did abstain from warfare against Hellenes, but they made an expedition against Cyprus with two hundred ships of their own and of their allies, under the command of Cimon.

 Sixty of these ships sailed to Egypt on the summons of Amyrtaeus, the king in the marshes, while the others laid siege to Citium.

 But Cimon died and a famine arose, and so they withdrew from Citium ; 449 B.C. 
 and on their way home, when off Salamis in Cyprus, they fought the Phoenicians, Cyprians and Cilicians by sea and on land.
 Gaining the victory in both battles they went back home, and with them returned the ships that had been in Egypt.

 After this the Lacedaemonians undertook the so-called sacred war, and getting possession of the temple at Delphi, delivered it to the Delphians;
 and afterwards, when they had withdrawn, the Athenians made an expedition, got possession of it, and delivered it again to the Phocians.

 Some time after this 447 B.C. the Athenians under the command of Tolmides son of Tolmaeus, with one thousand hoplites of their own and the respective quotas of their allies, made an expedition against Orchomenus and Chaeroneia and some other places in Boeotia, which were in the possession of the Boeotian exiles and therefore hostile.
 And after taking Chaeroneia and selling its inhabitants into slavery, they placed a garrison in it and departed.

 But while they were on the march they were attacked at Coronea by the Boeotian exiles from (rchomenus, together with some Locrians and Euboean exiles and others who held the same political views, and were defeated, some of the Athenians being slain and others taken alive.

 Accordingly the Athenians evacuated the whole of Boeotia, making a treaty upon the stipulation that they should receive back their prisoners.

 And so the Boeotian exiles were restored, and they as well as all the rest of the Boeotians again became autonomous.

 Not long after this 445 B. C. Euboea revolted from Athens;
 and Pericles had just crossed over to the island with an Athenian army when word was brought to him that Megara had revolted, that the Peloponnesians were about to invade Attica, and that all the Athenian garrison had been destroyed by the Megarians except such as had escaped to Nisaea.
 The Megarians had effected this revolt by bringing Corinthians, Sicyonians and Epidaurians to their aid.
 So Pericles in haste brought his army back again from Euboea.

 After this the Peloponnesians, under the command of Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedaemonians, advanced into Attica as far as Eleusis and Thria, ravaging the country;
 but without going further they returned home.

 Thereupon the Athenians again crossed over into Euboea under the command of Pericles and subdued the whole of it;
 the rest of the island they settled Setting up democracies, etc. cf. C.I.A. iv. 27 a. by agreement, but expelled the Hestiaeans from their homes and themselves occupied their territory.

 Withdrawing their troops from Euboea not long afterwards they made a truce with the Lacedaemonians and their allies which was to last for thirty years, restoring Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaea;
 for these were the places belonging to the Peloponnesians which the Athenians then held.

 Six years later a war arose between the Samians and the Milesians about the possession of Priene, and the Milesians, who were being worsted in the war, went to Athens and cried out against the Samians.
 They were seconded in their complaint by some private citizens from Samos itself who wished to revolutionize the government.

 So the Athenians sailed to Samos with forty ships and set up a democracy, taking as hostages of the Samians fifty boys and as many men, whom they deposited in Lemnos;

 then they withdrew from Samos, leaving a garrison behind.
 Some of the Samians, however, did not stay, but fled to the mainland, first making an alliance with the most influential men who remained in the city and with Pissuthnes son of Hystaspes, then satrap of Sardis;
 and collecting mercenary troops to the number of seven hundred they crossed over by night to Samos.

 First they attacked the popular party and got most of them into their power;
 then they secretly got their hostages out of Lemnos and revolted from Athens, handing over to Pissuthnes the Athenian officers and garrison that were on the island, and at once set about preparing an expedition against Miletus.
 And the Byzantines also joined in their revolt.

 But when the Athenians heard of this they sailed for Samos with sixty ships.
 Sixteen of these, however, they did not make use of on this enterprise, for these had already gone, some toward Caria to keep watch upon the Phoenician ships, others towards Chios and Lesbos to summon aid;
 but with forty-four ships, under the command of Pericles and nine others, Sophocles was on the fleet, as one of the ten generals of the year. they fought a sea-fight at the island of Tragia against seventy ships of the Samians, of which twenty were transport—ships, the whole fleet being on the way back from Miletus;
 and the Athenians were victorious.

 Later, having received a reinforcement from Athens of forty ships and from the Chians and Lesbians of twenty-five, they disembarked, and being superior to the Samians with their infantry proceeded to invest the city with three walls, at the same time blockading it by sea as well.

 But Pericles took sixty ships away from the blockading fleet and departed in haste towards Caunus in Caria, a report having come that a Phoenician fleet was sailing against his forces;
 for Stesagoras and others had gone from Samos with five vessels to fetch the Phoenician ships.

 Meanwhile the Samians suddenly made a sally and fell upon the Athenian naval station, which was unprotected by a stockade, destroying the guardships and defeating in a sea-fight the ships that put out against them.
 And for about fourteen days they were masters of the sea off their coast, bringing in and carrying out whatever they wished;

 but when Pericles came they were again blockaded by sea.
 And afterwards a reinforcement came from Athens of forty ships under the command of Thucydides, Possibly the historian, as some have thought; others explain as the son of Melesias and opponent of Pericles; still others as the poet from the deme of Acherdus. Hagnon and Phormio, twenty under Tlepolemus and Anticles, and thirty from Chios and Lesbos.

 Now the Samians did indeed put up a sea-fight for a short time, but they were unable to hold out, and in the ninth month 439 B.C. were reduced by siege and agreed to a capitulation, pulling down their walls, giving hostages, delivering over their ships, and consenting to pay back by instalments the money spent upon the siege.
 The Byzantines too came to terms, agreeing to be subjects as before.

 It was not many years Hardly four years, since the naval battle between the Corcyraeans and Corinthians seems to have occurred 435 B.C. after this that the events already narrated occurred, namely the Corcyraean affair, 1.24 - 1.40 . the Potidaean, 1.54 - 1.66 . and all the other incidents The transactions in the Spartan assembly, 1.67 - 1.88 . lxxxviii. that furnished an occasion for this war.

 And all these operations of the Hellenes, against one another and against the Barbarian, took place in the interval of about fifty years between the retreat of Xerxes and the beginning of this war. 479-432 B.C. 
 It was in this period that the Athenians established their rule more firmly and themselves advanced to great power.
 And the Lacedaemonians, though aware of their growing power, made no attempt to check it, except to a trifling extent, remaining indifferent the greater part of the time, since they had never been quick to go to war except under compulsion, and in this case were in some degree precluded from interference by wars of their own. The Helot rebellion, 1.101 . 
 But at last the power of the Athenians began clearly to exalt itself and they were laying hands upon their allies.
 Then the Lacedaemonians could bear it no longer, but determined that they must attack the Athenian power with all zeal and overthrow it, if they could, by undertaking this war. The Lacedaemonians themselves, then, Resuming the narrative interrupted at the end of Thuc. 1.88 . had decided that the treaty had been broken and that the Athenians were in the wrong, and sending to Delphi they asked the god if it would be advisable for them to go to war.

 The god answered them, as it is said, that if they warred with all their might, victory would be theirs, and said that he himself would help them, whether invoked or uninvoked.

 But they wished to summon their allies again and put 432 B.C. to them the question whether they should go to war.
 And when the envoys from the allies had come and an assembly was held, the others said what they wished, most of them complaining of the Athenians and demanding that the war should be entered upon, and especially the Corinthians.
 They had already, before the meeting, privately begged the allies city by city to vote for the war, fearing lest Potidaea would be destroyed before help came, and now, being also present at this meeting, they came forward last of all and spoke as follows:

 " Men of the allies, we can no longer complain of the Lacedaemonians that they have not both themselves voted for the war and also brought us together for this object.
 And that is right;
 for it is the duty of leaders, while equitably considering their particular interests, to have special regard for the general weal, just as in other matters they are honoured above all.

 Now those of us who have had dealings with the Athenians in the past do not need to be taught to be on our guard against them.
 But those who dwell more in the interior and away from any trade-route should be warned that, if they do not aid those who are on the seaboard, they will find it more difficult to bring the products of the land down to the sea and to get in return what the sea gives to the mainland;
 and that they should not be careless judges of what is said here, as though it were no concern of theirs, but should expect that, if they abandon the seacoast to its fate, the danger may possibly some day reach them, and that they are deliberating upon their own interests no less than upon ours.

 They ought not, therefore, to hesitate a moment to adopt war in place of peace.
 For though it is the part of men of discretion to remain tranquil should they not be wronged, it behooves brave men, when wronged, to go from peace to war, but when a favourable opportunity offers to abandon war and resume peace again, allowing themselves neither to be elated by success in war nor to be so enamoured of the quiet of peace as to submit to wrong.

 For he who for the sake of his comfort shrinks from war is likely, should he remain tranquil, very speedily to forfeit the delights of ease which caused him to shrink;
 and he who presumes upon his success in war has failed to reflect how treacherous is the confidence which elates him.

 For many enterprises which were ill-planned have succeeded because the adversary has proved to be still worse advised, and yet more, which to all appearances were well advised, have turned out the opposite way and brought disgrace.
 For no one ever carries out a plan with the same confidence with which he conceives it;
 on the contrary we form our fond schemes with a feeling of security, but when it comes to their execution, we are possessed by fear and fall short of success.

 " And so now in our own case, it is because we are suffering wrongs and have ample grounds for complaint that we are stirring up this war, and as soon as we have avenged our wrongs upon the Athenians we will bring the war to an end when occasion offers.

 And for many reasons we are likely to prevail: first, because we are superior in point of numbers and in military experience ;

 secondly, because we all with one accord obey the word of command;
 and, thirdly, on the sea, where their strength lies, we shall be able to equip a fleet, not only with the means which we severally possess, but also with the funds stored up at Delphi and Olympia. cf. Thuc. 2.13.4 , where Pericles suggests a similar resource. The Delphic oracle favoured the Peloponnesians, according to 1.118.3 . 
 For by contracting a loan we can use the inducement of higher pay to entice away from them their mercenary sailors;
 for the forces of the Athenians are made up of hirelings rather than of their own citizens, whereas ours, whose strength lies more in the quality of the men than in the pay they get, would be less subject to such defection.

 And so, if we win a single victory at sea, in all probability they are defeated. Through the mercenary sailors flocking to the Peloponnesian side for higher pay. 
 If, however, they should still hold out, we on our part shall have more time for practice in seamanship, and asp soon as we have brought our skill to a parity with theirs, in courage, assuredly, we shall be superior.
 For the excellence that nature has given us cannot become theirs through instruction, whereas the advantage they have in skill can be acquired by us through practice.

 And as to the money we need to accomplish all this,we shall provide it by contributions;
 or strange were it, if their allies should never fail to pay tribute to ensure their own slavery, but we, to secure at once vengeance upon our enemies and safety for ourselves, shall prove unwilling to spend money, aye, and that we may not be robbed of that very wealth and withal have it used to our destruction.

 " But we have other ways also of waging war—inducing their allies to revolt, which is the best means of depriving them of the revenues in which their strength consists, the planting of forts in their territory, and all the other measures which one cannot now foresee.
 For war least of all conforms to fixed rules, but itself in most cases has to form its plans to suit the occasion as its own resources allow;
 when, therefore, a man keeps his temper cool while dealing with war, he is more likely to be safe, while he who loses his temper over it Or, reading αὐτόν with the MSS., “makes blunders through his own fault as much as anything,” ie. “the man who loses his head has only himself to blame for his disasters.” makes more blunders. "

 And let us reflect also that, if we individually were involved in a dispute about mere boundary-lines with an enemy who was no more than our equal, that might be borne;
 but as the case stands, the Athenians are quite a match for us all together, and still more powerful against us city by city.
 Hence, unless all of us together, every nation and town, with one accord resist them, they will easily overpower us because we shall be divided.
 And as to defeat—even though this is terrible to hear, let it be well understood that it brings nothing else than downright slavery.

 That such an outcome should even be spoken of as a possibility, or that so many cities might suffer ill at the hands of one, is a disgrace to the Peloponnesus.
 In such a case men would say of us, either that we deserved our fate, or that through cowardice we submitted to it, and that we were clearly degenerate sons of our fathers, who liberated Hellas, whereas we, so far from making this liberty secure, should be allowing a city to be established as a tyrant in our midst, though we claim the reputation of deposing the monarchs in single states.

 We know not how such a course can be acquitted of one of the three gravest errors, stupidity or cowardice, or carelessness.
 For I cannot suppose that, escaping those errors, you have reached that most fatal spirit of proud disdain καταφρόνησις is that proud and haughty spirit which precedes and invites a fall. It seems impossible to reproduce in English the assonance of the words καταφρόνησις ἀφροσύνη Thucydides was fond of paronomasia; cf. Thuc. 1.33.4 . which has ruined so many men that it has taken on a new name, that of despicable folly.

 "With regard, however, to what is past and done, what need is there to find fault at length, except in so far as that is profitable for what is present?
 But with a view to what shall be hereafter, we should devote every effort to the task in hand—for to win virtue Or, the rewards of virtue --honour, renown. by toils is our heritage—and make no change of custom because you now have a slight superiority in wealth and power;
 for it is not right that attributes which have been won through poverty should be lost through prosperity.
 Nay, you should go into the war with confidence, and for many reasons: the god has spoken through his oracle and promised that he himself will help you;
 all the rest of Hellas will join you in the struggle, partly through fear and partly through self-interest;

 and, finally, you will not be the ones to break the treaty, inasmuch as the god, in bidding you go to war, considers it to have been transgressed already, but you will be going to the defence of a treaty that has been violated.
 For it is not those who fight in self-defence that break a treaty, but those who attack others unprovoked.

 "So then, since from every quarter a favourable opportunity offers itself to you to go to war, and since we recommend this course in the common interest—if it be true that identity of interest' is the surest policy for states and individuals to follow—make haste to succour the Potidaeans, who are Dorians and besieged by Ionians—the reverse of what used to be—and to recover the liberty of the rest;
 since it will no longer do for us to wait, when some are already being injured, and others, if it shall become known that we have had a meeting and dare not defend ourselves, will soon suffer the same fate.

 On the contrary, men of the allies, recognize that we are now facing the inevitable, and at the same time that this proposal is for the best;
 and vote for the war, not fearing the immediate danger, but coveting the more enduring peace which will result from the war.
 For peace is more firmly established when it follows war, but to refuse to go to war from a desire for tranquillity is by no means so free from danger.

 And so, in the conviction that the state which has set itself up as a tyrant in Hellas is a menace to all alike, ruling over some already and designing to rule over others, let us attack and reduce it, and henceforth dwell in security ourselves and set free those Hellenes who are already enslaved."

 Thus spoke the Corinthians.
 And the Lacedaemonians when they had heard the opinions of all, put the vote in succession to all the allied states which were present, both great and small;
 and the majority voted for war.

 But though the decision was made it was impossible for them to take up arms at once, as they were unprepared;
 it was determined, however, that the several states should make the fitting preparations and that there should be no delay.
 Nevertheless, in providing themselves with what was needed there was spent, not indeed a full year, but somewhat less, before they invaded Attica and took up the war openly.

 During this interval they kept sending embassies to the Athenians and making complaints, that they might have as good a pretext as possible for making war, in case the Athenians should refuse to consider them.

 And first the Lacedaemonian envoys bade the Athenians drive out the "curse of the goddess."
 The curse was as follows:

 There was an Athenian in days of old named Cylon, a victor at Olympia, of noble birth and powerful;
 and he had married a daughter of Theagenes, a Megarian, who was at that time tyrant of Megara.

 Now Cylon consulted the oracle at Delphi, and the god in answer told him to seize the Acropolis of Athens "at the greatest festival of Zeus."

 So he obtained a force from Theagenes and, persuading his friends to help, when the Olympic festival in the Peloponnesus came on he seized the Acropolis with a view to making himself tyrant;
 for he thought that the Olympic festival was not only the greatest festival of Zeus, but also in a manner was connected with him as having won an Olympic victory. On this first attempt to establish a tyranny in Athens, see also Hdt. 5.71 ; Plut. Sol. 12 . It was not a rising of the people against the nobles, but the attempt of an ambitious man who aspired to royal power, supported only by a few friends and a body of Megarian soldiers. To the mass of the people it seemed to portend subjection to Megara, so they flocked in to crush the movement, not, as Cylon hoped, to support it. 

 But whether the oracle meant the greatest festival in Attica or somewhere else he did not go on to consider, and the oracle did not make it clear.
 For, in fact, the Athenians also have a festival in honour of Zeus Meilichius, the Diasia, as it is called, a very great festival celebrated outside the city, whereat all the people offer sacrifices, many making offerings A scholiast suggests cakes ( πέμματα ) made in the forms of animals. peculiar to the country instead of victims.
 But Cylon, thinking that he was right in his opinion, made his attempt.

 And the Athenians, when they were aware of it, came in a body from the fields against them and sitting down before the Acropolis laid siege to it.

 But as time passed the Athenians grew weary of the siege and most of them went away, committing the task of guarding to the nine Archons, to whom they also gave full power to settle the whole matter as they might determine to be best;

 for at that time i.e. before the legislation of Solon; from that time the power of the Archons decreased, and was restricted chiefly to judicial functions. the nine Arclons transacted most of the public business.

 But Cylon and those who were being besieged with him were in hard straits through lack of food and water.
 So Cylon and his brother escaped;
 but the rest, when they were in great distress and some of them were even dying of hunger, sat down as suppliants at the altar Of Athena Polias. on the Acropolis.

 And the Athenians who had been charged with guarding them, when they saw them dying in the temple, caused them to arise on promise of doing them no harm, and leading them away put them to death;
 and some who in passing by took refuge at the altar of the Awful Goddesses The sanctuary of the Eumenides, which lay between the Acropolis and the Areopagus. they dispatched even there.
 For this act both they and their descendants Chiefly the Alcmaeonidae, whose head was Megacles, Archon at the time of Cylon's attempt. were called accursed and sinners against the Goddess.

 Accordingly the accursed persons were driven out not only by the Athenians but also at a later time by Cleomenes the Lacedaemonian, with the help of a faction of the Athenians, during a civil strife, when they drove out the living and disinterred and cast out the bones of the dead.
 Afterwards, however, they were restored, and their descendants are still in the city.

 It was this "curse " that the Lacedaemonians now bade the Athenians drive out, principally, as they pretended, to avenge the honour of the gods, but in fact because they knew that Pericles son of Xanthippus was implicated in the curse on his mother's side, Pericles was a descendant in the sixth generation from Megacles, his mother Agariste being niece of the Alcmaeonid Cleisthenes ( Hdt 6.131 .). and thinking that, if he were banished, they would find it easier to get from the Athenians the concessions they hoped for.

 They did not, however, so much expect that he would suffer banishment, as that they would discredit him with his fellow-citizens, who would feel that to some extent his misfortune As belonging to the accursed family. would be the cause of the war.

 For being the most powerful man of his time and the leader of the state, he was opposed to the Lacedaemonians in all things, and would not let the Athenians make concessions, but kept urging them on to the war.

 The Athenians answered with the demand that the Lacedaemonians should drive out the curse of Taenarus.
 For the Lacedaemonians had on one occasion caused some suppliant Helots to leave their refuge in the temple of Poseidon at Taenarus, then had led them off and put them to death;
 and the Lacedaemonians believe that it was because of this sacrilege that the great earthquake cf. Thuc. 1.101.2 . befell them at Sparta.

 And the Athenians also bade them drive out the curse of Athena of the Brazen House. So called from her temple or shrine in the citadel at Sparta. Pausanias says ( 3.17.2 ) both temple and statue were of bronze. 
 And this is the way it was incurred.

 After Pausanias the Lacedaemonian had been recalled by the Spartans, on the first occasion, 477 B.C. cf. Thuc. 1.95.3 . from his command on the Hellespont, and on trial had been acquitted of wrong-doing, he was never again sent out in a public capacity, but privately and on his own account he took a trireme of Hermione without authority of the Lacedaemonians and came to the Hellespont, to take part, as he pretended, in the Persian war, but in reality to carry on an intrigue with the Great King—an enterprise to which he had set his hand in the first instance also, his aim being to become master of all Hellas.

 He had namely first laid up for himself with the King a store of gratitude in the following circumstances, and thus had begun the whole affair.

 When he was in that quarter before, after the return of the Hellenic fleet from Cyprus, cf. Thuc. 1.94.2 . he had taken Byzantium, then in the possession of the Persians, and certain connections and kinsmen of the King were captured in the place when the city fell.
 These prisoners he sent back to the King without the knowledge of the allies in general, whom he gave to understand that they had escaped from him.

 And he was carrying on this intrigue in concert with Gongylus the Eretrian, the very man whom he had placed in charge of Byzantium and the captives.
 And he also sent a letter by Gongylus to the King, in which the following was written, as was afterwards discovered:

 "Pausanias, the Spartan commander, wishing to do you a favour, sends you back these men whom he took with the spear.
 And I make the proposal, if it seems good to you also, to marry your daughter and to make Sparta and the rest of Hellas subject to you.
 And I am able, I think, to accomplish these things with the help of your counsel.
 If any of these things pleases you, send a trusty man to the sea, and through him we shall in future confer."
 So much the letter disclosed.

 Xerxes was pleased with the letter, and sent Artabazus son of Pharnaces to the sea, commanding him to take over the satrapy of Dascylium, superseding Megabates, who was governor before;
 and he charged him with a letter in reply to Pausanias, bidding him transmit it to him in Byzantium as quickly as possible and to show him the seal, and if Pausanias should give him any direction about the King's affairs, to execute it with all care and fidelity.

 And he on his arrival did other things as he was told and transmitted the letter.
 And this reply of the King ran as follows:

 " Thus saith King Xerxes to Pausanias: As touching the men whom thou didst save for me out of Byzantium beyond the sea, a store of gratitude is laid up for thee, of record, in our house forever, and with thy words also I am pleased.
 And let neither night nor day stay thee to make thee remiss in performing aught of what thou dost promise mee;
 and let nothing hinder thee, either expense of gold and silver or number of troops, if there be need of their presence anywhere;
 but with Artabazus, a good man, whom I have sent to thee, transact with confidence my business and thine as shall be most honourable and best for both of us."

 When Pausanias received this letter, although even before this he had been held in high consideration by the Hellenes because he had led them at Plataea, he was then far more elated and could no longer bring himself to live in the usual manner of his people, but clad himself in Persian apparel whenever he went forth from Byzantium, and when he travelled through Thrace a body-guard of Medes and Egyptians attended him;
 he had his table served in Persian style, and indeed could not conceal his real purpose, but by such trifling acts showed plainly what greater designs he purposed in his heart to accomplish thereafter.

 And so he made himself difficult of access, and indulged in such a violent temper towards everybody that no one could come near him;
 and this was one of the chief reasons why the allies went over to the Athenians.

 Now it was just this conduct that had caused the Lacedaemonians in the first instance to recall Pausanias, when they learned of it;
 and when this second time, on his sailing away in the ship of Hermione without their authority, it was evident that he was acting in the very same manner—when, after being forcibly dislodged from Byzantium by the Athenians, instead of returning to Sparta, he settled at Colonae in the Troad and was reported to the ephors to be intriguing with the Barbarians and tarrying there for no good purpose—then at length they held back no longer, but sent a herald with a skytale-dispatch, The σκυτάλη was a staff used for writing dispatches. The Lacedaemonians had two round staves of one size, the one kept at Sparta, the other in possession of commanders abroad. A strip of paper was rolled slantwise round the staff and the dispatch written lengthwise on it; when unrolled the dispatch was unintelligible, but rolled slantwise round the commander's skytale it could be read. in which they told him not to lag behind the herald, or the Spartans would declare war upon him.

 And he, wishing to avoid suspicion as far as possible, and confident that he could dispose of the charge by the use of money, returned the second time to Sparta.
 And at first he was thrown into prison by the ephors, who have the power to do this in the case of the king himself;
 then, having contrived after a time to get out, he offered himself for trial to any who might wish to examine into his case.

 There was, indeed, no clear proof in the possession of the Spartans, either his personal enemies or the state at large, on the strength of which they could with entire confidence proceed to punish a man who was of the royal family and held high office for the time being—for as cousin of Pleistarchus son of Leonidas, who was king and still a minor, he was acting as regent for him;

 but he, by his disregard of propriety, and particularly by his aping of the Barbarians, gave them much ground for suspecting that he did not want to remain an equal in the present order of things at Sparta.
 And they went back into his past and scrutinized all his other acts, to see if perchance he had in his mode of life departed from established customs, and they recalled especially that he had once presumed, on his own authority, to have inscribed on the tripod at Delphi, A golden tripod set upon a three-headed bronze serpent ( 9.81 ). The gold tripod was carrid off by the Phocians in the Sacred War ( Paus. 10.13.5 , but the bronze pillar, eighteen feet high, of three intertwined snakes, was removed by the Emperor Constantine to Constantinople and placed in the hippodrome, the modern Atmeidan, where it still is. It contains the names of thirty-one Greek states which took part in the Persian War. which the Hellenes dedicated as first fruits of the spoils they had won fiom the Persians, the following elegiac couplet:

 
" When as captain of the Hellenes he had destroyed the Persian host, Pausanias dedicated this memorial to Phoebus. The distich was composed by Simonides. ”
 Now the Lacedaemonians had immediately chiselled off these verses and inscribed on the tripod by name all the cities which had had a part in overthrowing the Barbarians and had together set up this offering.
 The act of Pausanias, however, was felt at the time to have been a transgression, and now that he had got into this further trouble, it stood out more clearly than ever as having been but a prelude to his present designs.

 They were informed also that he was intriguing with the Helots;
 and it was even so, for he was promising them freedom and citizenship if they would join him in a revolt and help him accomplish his whole plan.

 But not even then, nor relying on certain Helots who had turned informers, did they think it best to take harsh measures against him;
 they adhered to their usual method in dealing with men of their own class—not to be hasty, in the case of a Spartan, in adopting an irrevocable decision unless they had indisputable proofs.
 But at last, as it is said, the man who was to take to Artabazus Pausanias' last letter to the King, a man of Argilus who had once been a favourite of his and had hitherto been most loyal to him, turned informer.
 For he took fright when he called to mind that no previous messenger had ever come back again;
 and so, having made a counterfeit seal, in order that his act might not be discovered, in case he should be wrong in his suspicion or in case Pausanias should ask to make some alteration in the letter, he opened the letter and in fact found written therein, as he suspected he should find something of the sort to have been directed, an order for his own death.

 At this point the ephors, when the man showed them the letter, were at last more nearly convinced, but they wished besides to hear with their own ears some word from Pausanias' own lips;
 so in accordance with a prearranged plan the man went as a suppliant to Taenarus and put up there a hut divided by a partition.
 In the inner room of the hut he concealed some of the ephors, and when Pausanias visited him and asked the reason of his taking the position of a suppliant, they heard clearly everything that was said: they heard the man accuse Pausanias of having written the order about himself, reveal the other items of the plot in detail, and protest that, though he had never yet compromised Pausanias in his errands to the King, the special honour awarded him was no better than that which the common run of his servants received—to be put to death;
 and they heard Pausanias acknowledge these same things, urge the man not to be angry with him this time, offer him a guarantee that he might leave the temple in safety, and finally request him to go on his way with all speed and not frustrate the negotiations.

 When the ephors had heard all the details they went back home for the present, but inasmuch as they now had certain knowledge, they were planning to make the arrest in the city.
 And the story goes that when Pausanias was about to be arrested in the street, he saw the face of one of the ephors as he was approaching and realised for what purpose he was coming, and that another ephor out of friendship warned him by giving a covert nod, whereupon he set off on a run for the temple of Athena of the Brazen House, and reached the refuge first, as the sacred precinct was near by.
 Entering then into a building of no great size belonging to the temple, that he might not suffer from exposure under the open sky, he kept quiet.

 For the moment then the ephors were distanced in their pursuit, but afterwards they took the roof off the building and, watching until he was inside and shutting off his retreat, walled up the doors;
 then they invested the place and starved him to death.

 And when he was about to expire, imprisoned as he was in the building, The temple would have been polluted if he had been allowed to die there. they perceived his condition and brought him out of the temple still breathing;
 but when he was brought out he died immediately.

 It was their first intention to cast him into the Caeadas, A cleft in the mountains not far from the city, probably near the modern Mistra, into which in early times prisoners, in later, corpses of criminals, were thrown; cf. Strabo, 7.5.7 ; Paus. 4.18.3 . where they throw malefactors;
 but afterwards they decided to bury him somewhere near the city.
 But the god at Delphi afterwards warned the Lacedaemonians by oracle to transfer him to the place where he died (and he now lies in the entrance to the precinct, as an inscription on some columns testifies), and that they should recompense Athena of the Brazen House with two bodies in place of one, since their act had brought a curse upon them.
 So they had two bronze statues made and dedicated them to Athena to be a substitute for Pausanias.

 Thus it was that the Athenians, cf. 1.128.1 in response to the demand of the Lacedaemonians, ordered them to drive out the curse of Taenarus, seeing that the god also declared it to be a curse.

 But when Pausanias was thus convicted of treasonable dealings with Persia, the Lacedaemonians sent envoys to the Athenians and accused Themistocles also of complicity in the plot, in accordance with discoveries they had made in connection with their investigation about Pausanias;

 and they demanded that he be punished in the same way.
 The Athenians agreed, but as he happened to have been ostracised, and, though living in Argos, frequently visited other parts of the Peloponnesus also, they sent some men, accompanied by the Lacedaemonians (who were quite ready to join in the pursuit), with instructions to arrest him wherever they chanced to find him.