On their arrival, the truce concluded at Pylus was immediately at an end, and the Lacedaemonians asked back their ships, according to agreement. But the Athenians, alleging as grounds of complaint an attack on the fort in contravention of the truce, and other particulars which appear not worth mentioning, refused to return them; laying stress on its having been said, that if there were any violation of it whatever, the truce was at an end. The Lacedaemonians denied it, and charging them with injustice in their conduct respecting the ships, went away, and set themselves to the war.

 And now hostilities were carried on at Pylus with the greatest vigour on both sides; the Athenians cruising round the island continually with two ships in opposite directions during the day, while by night they were all moored round it, except on the side of the open sea, whenever there was a wind blowing; (twenty ships too had joined them from Athens to assist in the blockade, so that in all they amounted to seventy; and the Peloponnesians being encamped on the continent, and making attacks on the fort, on the look-out for an opportunity, should any offer, of rescuing their men. In the mean time the Syracusans and their allies in Sicily, having taken to join the ships on guard at Messana the other squadron which they were preparing, carried on the war from that place.

 They were especially urged on to this by the Locrians, out of hatred for the people of Rhegium, whose territory they had themselves also invaded with all their forces.

 And they wished to try the result of a sea-fight, seeing that the Athenian ships stationed at Messana were but few; while by the greater part of them, including those that were to come thither, they heard that the island was being blockaded.

 For if they gained the advantage by sea, they hoped that by blockading Rhegium both with their land-forces and their ships they would easily reduce it, and then their success would be secured; for as the promontory of Rhegium in Italy, and that of Messana in Sicily, lay close together, the Athenians would not be able to cruise against them, and command the strait.

 This strait is formed by the sea between Rhegium and Messana, where Sicily is at the least distance from the continent; and is the Charybdis, so called, through which Ulysses is said to have sailed. And as the sea falls into it through a narrow passage from two great mains, the Tuscan and Sicilian, flowing at the same time with a strong current, it has naturally been considered dangerous. In this strait then the Syracusans and their allies, with rather more than thirty ships, were compelled to engage, late in the day, about the passage of a boat, and put out to meet sixteen vessels from Athens and eight from Rhegium.

 Being defeated by the Athenians, they sailed off with all speed, as they severally happened, to their own camps, the one at Rhegium, the other at Messana, after the loss of one ship, night having overtaken them in the action. After this, the Locrians withdrew from the Rhegian territory;

 and the fleet of the Syracusans and their allies united and came to anchor at Cape Pelorus in the Messanian territory, their land-forces having also joined them.

 The Athenians and Rhegians sailed up to them, and seeing their ships unmanned, attacked them, and now on their side lost a ship, through an iron grapple having been thrown on it, but the men swam out of it.

 Afterwards, when the Syracusans had gone on board their ships, and were being towed along shore to Messana, the Athenians again advanced against them, and lost another vessel, the enemy having

 For the different explanations of ἀποσιμωσάντων, see Arnold's note. got their ships out into the open sea, and charged them first.

 Thus the Syracusans had the advantage in the passage along shore and in the engagement, which was such as has been described, and passed on to the port of Messana.

 The Athenians, on receiving tidings that Camarina was going to be betrayed to the Syracusans by Archias and his party, sailed thither; while the Messanians, in the mean time, with all their forces made an expedition, at once by land and by sea, against Naxos, a Chalcidian town near their borders.

 The first day, having driven the Naxians within their walls, they ravaged the land, and the next day sailed round with their fleet, and did the same in the direction of the river Acesines, while with their land-forces they made their incursion towards the city.

 Meanwhile the Sicels came down from the highlands in great numbers to assist against the Messanians; and when the Naxians saw them, they took courage, and cheering themselves with the belief that the Leontines and other Grecian allies were coming to their aid, made a sudden sally from the town, and fell upon the Messanians, and having routed them, slew more than a thousand, the rest having a miserable return homeward; for the barbarians fell upon them on the road, and cut off most of them.

 The ships, having put in at Messana, subsequently dispersed for their several homes. Immediately after this, the Leontines and their allies, in conjunction with the Athenians, turned their arms against Messana, in the belief of its having been weakened; and attempted it by an attack, the Athenians with their ships on the side of the harbour, the land-forces on the side of the town.

 But the Messanians, and some Locrians with Demoteles, who after its disaster had been left in it as a garrison, suddenly fell upon them, and routed the greater part of the Leontine troops, and slew many of them. The Athenians, on seeing it, landing from their ships, went to their assistance, and drove the Messanians back again into the town, having come upon them while in confusion; they then erected a trophy and returned to Rhegium.

 After this, the Greeks in Sicily continued to make war on each other by land without the co-operation of the Athenians. At Pylus, in the mean time, the Athenians were still blockading the Lacedaemonians in the island, and the Peloponnesian forces on the continent remained where they were. But the watch was kept by the Athenians with great trouble, through want of both victuals and water;

 for there was no spring but one in the citadel of Pylus itself, and that not a copious one; but most of them were drinking such water as they would be likely to find by digging through the shingle near the sea. They suffered too from want of room, being encamped in a narrow space;

 and as the ships had no roadstead, some of them took their meals on shore in their turn, while others lay off at anchor. But their greatest discouragement was caused by the time being prolonged beyond their expectation;

 for they imagined that they should reduce them to surrender in a few days, shut up in a desert island as they were, and having only brackish water to drink.

 The cause of this delay was the Lacedaemonians having proclaimed, that any one who wished should carry into the island ground corn, wine, cheese, and any other food that might be serviceable in the siege; rating it at a high price, and promising freedom to any of the Helots who should carry it in. Many others therefore carried it in, at all risks, and especially the Helots, putting out from any part of the Peloponnesians, as might happen, and landing by night on the side of the island towards the open sea.

 But what they particularly watched for was a chance of being carried to shore by a wind;

 for they more easily escaped the look-out of the triremes, when there was a breeze from sea-ward; as it was then impossible for the cruisers to anchor round it, while their own landing was effected in a reckless manner; for their boats being rated at their value in money, they drove them up on the beach, while the soldiers were watching for them at the landing-places in the island. But all that ran the risk in calm weather were taken prisoners.

 Divers also swam in under water on the side of the harbour, dragging by a cord in skins poppy-seed mixed with honey, and bruised linseed; but though these escaped unobserved at first, precautions were afterwards taken against them.

 Indeed each party contrived in every possible manner, the one to throw in provisions, the other to prevent its being done without their observation. When they heard at Athens the circumstances of the army, that it was thus being harassed, and that corn was thus taken in for the men in the island, they were perplexed, and afraid that winter might surprise them in the blockade. For they saw that both carrying provisions round the Peloponnese would then be impossible—at the same time they were in an uninhabited country, [where they could get none themselves,] and even in summer they were not able to send round sufficient supplies for them—and that the blockade by sea of so harbourless a country could not be continued; but that the men would either escape through their giving up their guard, or would watch for a storm, and sail out in the boats that carried the corn in for them.

 Above all, they were alarmed by the conduct of the Lacedaemonians; for they imagined that it was from their having some strong point on their side that they made no more overtures to them;

 and they regretted not having assented to the treaty. Cleon observing their suspicions of him, with regard to the obstacles thrown in the way of the convention, said that their informants did not speak the truth. When those who had come with the tidings advised them, if they did not believe them, to send some commissioners to see, he himself, with Theogenes, was chosen by the Athenians for that purpose.

 Aware therefore that he would be compelled either to give the same account as those whom he was slandering, or to be proved a liar if he gave a different one, he advised the Athenians—seeing that they were really more inclined in their minds for a fresh expedition—that they should not send commissioners, nor delay and waste their opportunity, but sail against the men, if they thought the report was true.

 And he pointedly alluded to Nicias the son of Niceratus, who was general at the time; hating him, and tauntingly observing, that it was easy, if their generals were men, to sail with a force and take those in the island; and that if he had himself been in office, he would have done it. Nicias, observing that the Athenians began to murmur at Cleon for not sailing as it was, if he thought it so easy, and at the same time seeing that he aimed his taunts at him, desired him to take whatever force he chose, as far as the generals were concerned, and make the attempt.

 Cleon, thinking at first that he only pretended to give up the command to him, was prepared to accept it; but when he found that he really wished to transfer it to him, he drew back, and said that he was not general, but they; being afraid now, and not supposing that Nicias would have brought himself to retire in his favour.

 He, however, again urged him to undertake it, and resigned the command against Pylus, and called on the Athenians to attest it. They, as the multitude is ever wont to do, the more Cleon shrank from the expedition, and tried to escape from what he had said, pressed Nicias the more to give up the command to him, and called loudly on Cleon to set sail.

 So that not knowing how to evade his words any longer, he undertook the voyage, and, coming forward, said, that he was not afraid of the Lacedaemonians, but would set sail, taking with him no one out of the city, but only the Lemnians and Imbrians that were there, with some targeteers that had come to their aid from Oenus, and four hundred bowmen from other quarters. With these, in addition to the soldiers at Pylus, he said that within twenty days he would either bring the Lacedaemonians alive, or kill them on the spot.

 The Athenians were seized with laughter at his vain talking, but nevertheless the sensible part of them were pleased with the business, reckoning that they should gain one of two good things; either to be rid of Cleon, which they rather hoped, or, if deceived in their opinion, to get the Lacedaemonians into their hands. When he had thus arranged every thing in the assembly, and the Athenians had voted him the command of the expedition, having associated with himself one of the generals at Pylus, namely, Demosthenes, he prepared to set sail as quickly as possible.

 He chose Demosthenes for his colleague, because he heard that he was himself meditating a descent on the island. For the soldiers, being distressed by their want of room, and being a besieged rather than a besieging party, were eager to run all risks. The firing of the island had moreover given him confidence.

 For formerly, in consequence of its being extensively covered with wood, and pathless, from its having always been uninhabited, he was afraid, and considered this to be rather in favour of the enemy; as when he landed with a large force, they might attack him from an unseen position, and so do him damage. For, owing to the forest, their mistakes and amount of forces would not be so distinctly seen by him, while all the blunders of his troops would be visible to them; so that they might fall on him unexpectedly at whatever point they pleased, it being always in their power to make the attack.

 And if, again, he should force them to an engagement in the forest, he thought the smaller number, with knowledge of the country, would have an advantage over the larger without that knowledge; and that their own army, great as it was, might imperceptibly be cut off, while they could not see in which direction to assist each other. It was, above all, from his disaster in Aetolia, which in a great measure had been occasioned by the forest, that these thoughts struck him.

 The soldiers, however, having been compelled by want of room to land on the extremities of the island, and take their dinners, with a guard posted in advance; and one of them having unintentionally set fire to a small part of the wood, and a wind having afterwards risen, the greater part of it was consumed before they were aware of it.

 In this way then observing, on a clearer view, that the Lacedaemonians were more numerous than he had expected—for before this, he imagined that they took in provisions for a smaller number—and now perceiving that the Athenians were more in earnest about it, as a thing that was worth their attention, and that the island was more easy to land on, he was preparing for the adventure, by sending for troops from the neighbouring allies, and getting every thing else in readiness, when Cleon, after previously sending him word that he was coming, arrived at Pylus with the forces he had asked for.

 After their meeting, they sent, in the first place, a herald to the camp on the continent, wishing to know whether, without running any risk, they would desire the men in the island to surrender to them their arms and themselves, on condition of their being kept in mild custody, till some general agreement were concluded. When they did not accept their proposal, they waited one day, and on the next put out by night, having embarked all their heavy-armed on board a few vessels, and a little before morning effected a landing on each side of the island, both that of the open sea and that of the harbour, amounting to about eight hundred heavy-armed, and proceeded at a run against the first post in the island.

 For the following was the way in which the men were disposed. In this first guard there were thirty heavy-armed; the centre and most level part was held by their main body, and Epitadas their commander; while a small division guarded the very corner of the island, towards Pylus, which on the sea side was precipitous, and on the land side least exposed to assault. For there stood there an old fort,

 Literally,

 with stones as they were picked up.

 rudely built of stone, which they thought might be of service to them, if they should be driven to a compulsory retreat. In this way then were they posted. The Athenians immediately put to the sword the men forming the first guard, whom they had thus attacked; for they were still in their beds, or only just taking up their arms, the landing having surprised them, as they fancied that the ships were only sailing, according to custom, to their stations for the night.

 As soon as it was morning, the rest of the forces also disembarked, viz. all the crews of seventy ships and rather more,

(except the lowest rank of rowers,) with their different equipments; eight hundred bowmen, and no less a number of targeteers, the Messenian reinforcements, and all others who were in any positions about Pylus, except the garrison on the fortifications.

 By the arrangement of Demosthenes, they were divided into parties of two hundred, more or less, and occupied the highest grounds, that the enemy might be most severely harassed by being surrounded on all sides, and not know where to make resistance, but be annoyed by a double discharge of missiles; being attacked by those behind them, if they charged those before, and by those posted on each side, if they made a flank movement.

 And so, wherever they went, they would have the enemy on their rear, light-armed, and the most difficult to deal with, being strong at a distance from the use of arrows, darts, stones, and slings, and it being impossible even to get near them; for they would conquer while flying, and when their enemy retreated, would press them close. It was with such a view of the case that Demosthenes both originally planned the descent, and made his arrangements in the execution of it. The party under Epitadas, which was also the main division in the island, on seeing the first post cut off, and an army advancing against themselves, closed their ranks, and advanced to meet the heavy-armed of the Athenians, with a wish to engage with them; for they were stationed on their front, but the light-armed on their flanks and rear. They could not however come up with them, and avail themselves of their superior skill in arms;

 

(for the light troops kept them in check with their missiles from both sides; while at the same time the heavy-armed did not come on to meet them, but remained still;) but the irregulars, on whatever point they ran up and charged them most closely, they routed; and these again would retreat, and still defend themselves, being lightly equipped, and easily getting a good start in their flight, from the difficult nature of the ground, and its rough condition through being before uninhabited, over which the Lacedaemonians with their heavy armour could not pursue them. For some short time then they skirmished with each other in this way. But when the Lacedaemonians were no longer able with vigour to dash out against them where they made their attack, the light-armed, observing that they were now slackening in their resistance, and themselves deriving most confidence from a closer view—appearing as they did many times more numerous than the enemy—and having now more accustomed themselves to look on them no longer with such terror, because they had not at once suffered as much as they had expected, when they were first landing with spirits cowed at the thought of attacking Lacedaemonians; [under these circumstances, I say,] they despised them, and with a shout rushed on them in one body, and attacked them with stones, arrows, and darts, whichever came first to their hand.

 From the shouting thus raised, while they ran upon them, bewilderment seized them, as men unaccustomed to such a mode of fighting. The dust also from the wood that had been burnt was rising thick into the air, and it was impossible for any one to see before him, for the arrows and stones which, together with the dust, were flying from such a host of men.

 And here the action became distressing to the Lacedaemonians; for their caps were not proof against the arrows, and darts were broken in them, when they were struck; and they could make no use of their weapons, being excluded, so far as sight was concerned, from any view before them; and not hearing, for the louder shouts of the enemy, their own word of command, while danger surrounded them on every side, and they had no hope of any means of defending and saving them selves. At last, when many were now being wounded from constantly moving in the same place, they formed into a close body, and went to the fort in the corner of the island, which was not far off, and to their own guards there.

 On their giving way, the light-armed then at once took courage, and pressed on them with a far louder shout than ever. Those of the Lacedaemonians then who were overtaken in the retreat were slain; but the greater part escaped to the fort, and with the garrison that was there ranged themselves all along it, to defend themselves where it was assailable.

 The Athenians, on coming up, could not surround and enclose them, owing to the natural strength of the place, but advanced in front, and endeavoured to force their position.

 And thus for a long time, indeed for the greater part of the day, though suffering from the battle, dust, and sun, both sides held out; the one striving to drive them from the high ground, the other not to give way; and the Lacedaemonians now defended themselves more easily than before, as there was no surrounding them on the flanks. When the business was still undecided, the commander of the Messenians came to Cleon and Demosthenes, and told them that they were labouring in vain; but if they would give him a part of the bowmen and light-armed, to go round in their rear by a way that he should himself discover, he thought he could force the approach.

 Having received what he asked for, he started from a point out of the enemy's sight, that they might not observe it, and, advancing wherever the precipitous side of the island allowed a passage, and where the Lacedaemonians, relying on the strength of the ground, kept no guard, with great labour and difficulty he got round unobserved, and suddenly appearing on the height in their rear, struck the enemy with dismay at the unexpected movement, and gave much greater confidence to his friends by the sight of what they were looking for.

 And now the Lacedaemonians were exposed to missiles on both sides, and reduced to the same result (to compare a small case with a great one) as that which happened at Thermopylae; for those troops were cut off through the Persians' getting round by the path; and these, being more assailed on all sides, no longer held their ground, but from fighting, as they were, a few against many, and from weakness of body through want of provisions, they began to retreat; and so the Athenians now commanded the approaches. Cleon and Demosthenes, aware that if they gave way even the least degree more, they would be destroyed by the Athenian forces, stopped the engagement, and kept their men off them, wishing to take them alive to Athens, if by any means, in accordance with their proposals, they might be induced to surrender their arms, and yield to their present danger.

 And so they sent a herald, to ask if they would surrender their arms and themselves to the Athenians,

 Literally,

 for them to decide as they pleased

 to be treated at their discretion. On hearing this, the greater part of them lowered their shields, and waved their hands, to show that they accepted the proposal. After this, when the cessation of hostilities had taken place, a conference was held between Cleon and Demosthenes, and Styphon the son of Pharax, on the other side; for Epitadas, the first of their former commanders, had been killed, and Hippagretas, the next in command, was lying amongst the slain, still alive, but given up for dead; and Styphon had been chosen, according to custom, to take the command in case of any thing happening to them.

 He, then, and those who were with him, said that they wished to send a herald to the Lacedaemonians on the mainland, and ask what they should do.

 When the Athenians would not allow any of them to leave the island, but themselves called for heralds from the mainland; and when questions had passed between them twice or thrice, the last man that came over to them from the Lacedaemonians on the mainland brought them this message;

 The Lacedaemonians bid you to provide for your own interests, so long as you do nothing dishonourable.

 So after consulting by themselves, they surrendered their arms and their persons.

 That day and the following night the Athenians kept them in custody; but the next day, after erecting a trophy on the island, they made all their other arrangements for sailing, and distributed the men amongst the captains of the fleet, to take charge of; while the Lacedaemonians sent a herald, and recovered their dead. Now the number of those who were killed in the island, or were taken alive, was as follows.

 There had crossed over in all four hundred and twenty heavy-armed, two hundred and ninety-two of which were taken [to Athens] alive, and the rest were slain. Of those that were living about one hundred and twenty were Spartans. On the side of the Athenians there were not many killed; for the battle was not fought hand to hand. The whole length of time that the men were blockaded, from the sea-fight to the battle in the island, was seventy-two days; for about twenty of which, whilst the ambassadors were gone to treat of peace, they had provisions given;

 but for the remainder, they were fed by those that sailed in by stealth. And there was still corn in the island, and other kinds of food were found in it; for Epitadas, the commander, supplied them with it more sparingly than he might have done.

 The Athenians then and the Peloponnesians returned with their forces from Pylus to their several homes, and Cleon's promise, though a mad one, was fulfilled; for within twenty days he took the men to Athens, as he engaged to do. And of all the events of the war this happened most to the surprise of the Greeks; for their opinion of the Lacedaemonians was, that neither for famine nor any other form of necessity would they surrender their arms, but would keep them, and fight as they could, till they were killed.

 Indeed they did not believe that those who had surrendered were men of the same stamp with those who had fallen; and thus one of the allies of the Athenians some time after asked one of the prisoners from the island, by way of insult, if those of them who had fallen were

 i. e.

 gentlemen

 of the true Spartan blood, such as they were so fond of representing themselves. See Arnold's note. honourable and brave men? to which he answered, that the

 One of the ordinary Spartan words to express what the other Greeks called οἰστός. 

 Id. 

 atractus (meaning the arrow) would be worth a great deal, if it knew the brave men from the rest; thus stating the fact, that any one was killed who came in the way of the stones and arrows. On the arrival of the men, the Athenians determined to keep them in prison, fill some arrangement should be made; and if the Lacedaemonians should before that invade their territory, to take them out and put them to death.

 They also arranged for the defence of Pylus; and the Messenians of Naupactus sent to the place, as to the land of their fathers, (for Pylus is a part of what was formerly the Messenian country,) such of their men as were most fit for the service, and plundered Laconia, and annoyed them most seriously by means of their common dialect.

 The Lacedaemonians having had no experience aforetime in such a predatory kind of warfare, and finding their Helots deserting, and fearing that they might see their country revolutionized to even a still greater extent, were not easy under it; but, although unwilling to show this to the Athenians, they sent ambassadors to them, and endeavoured to recover Pylus and the men.

 They, however, were grasping at greater advantages, and though they often went to them, sent them back without effecting any thing. These then were the things that happened about Pylus. The same summer, immediately after these events, the Athenians made an expedition against the Corinthian territory with eighty ships, two thousand heavy-armed of their own people, and two hundred cavalry on board horse-transports; the Milesians, Andrians, and Carystians, from amongst the allies, accompanying them, and Nicias the son of Niceratus taking the command, with two colleagues.

 Setting sail, they made land in the morning between

 i. e. the peninsula and the stream; the former running out into the sea, from the ridge of Mount Oneum. See the sketch of the coast in Arnold, vol. ii. the Chersonesus and Rheitus, on the beach adjoining to the spot above which is the Solygian hill, on which the Dorians in early times established themselves, and carried on war against the Corinthians in the city, who were Aeolians; and on which there now stands a village called Solygia. From this beach, where the ships came to land, the village is twelve stades off, the city of Corinth sixty, and the Isthmus twenty.

 The Corinthians, having heard long before from Argos that the armament of the Athenians was coming, went with succours to the Isthmus, all but those who lived above it: there were absent too in Ambracia and Leucadia five hundred of them, serving as a garrison; but the rest, with all their forces, were watching where the Athenians would make the land.

 But when they had come to during the night unobserved by them, and the appointed signals were raised to tell them of the fact, they left half their forces at Cenchreae, in case the Athenians should advance against Crommyon, and went to the rescue with all speed. And Battus, one of the generals, (for there were two present in the engagement,) took a battalion, and went to the village of Solygia to defend it, as it was unwalled; while Lycophron gave them battle with the rest.

 First, the Corinthians attacked the right wing of the Athenians, immediately after it had landed in front of Chersonesus; then the rest of their army also. And the battle was an obstinate one, and fought entirely hand to hand.

 The right wing of the Athenians and Carystians (for these had been posted in the extremity of the line) received the charge of the Corinthians, and drove them back after some trouble; but after retreating to a wall (for the ground was all on a rise) they assailed them with stones from the higher ground, and singing the paean, returned to the attack; which being received by the Athenians, the battle was again fought hand to hand.

 Meanwhile a battalion of the Corinthians, having gone to the relief of their left wing, broke the right of the Athenians, and pursued them to the sea; but the Athenians and Carystians from the ships drove them back again.

 The rest of the army on both sides was fighting without cessation, especially the right wing of the Corinthians, in which Lycophron was opposed to the left of the Athenians, and acting on the defensive; for they expected them to try for the village of Solygia. For a long time then they held out without yielding to each other; but afterwards (the Athenians having a serviceable force on their side in their cavalry, while the others had no horse) the Corinthians turned and retired to the hill, where they piled their arms, and did not come down again, but remained quiet.

 It was in this rout of the right wing that the greater part of them fell, and Lycophron their general. The rest of the army, whose flight, when it was broken, was effected in this manner—with neither hot pursuit nor hurry—withdrew to the higher ground, and there took up its position.

 The Athenians, finding that they no longer advanced to engage them, spoiled the dead, and took up their own, and immediately erected a trophy.

 But to that half of the Corinthians which had been posted at Cenchreae for protection, lest the enemy should sail against Crommyon, the battle was not visible, owing to [an intervening ridge of] Mount Oneum; but when they saw dust, and were aware of it, they immediately went to the scene of action; as also did the older Corinthians from the city, when they found what had been done.

 The Athenians, seeing them coming all together against them, and thinking that reinforcements were being brought by the neighbouring Peloponnesians, retreated with all speed to their ships, with the spoils and their own dead, except two whom they had left on the field because they could not find them.

 Having gone on board their ships, they crossed over to the islands that lie off the coast, and from them sent a herald, and took up under truce the bodies they had left behind them. There were killed in the battle, on the side of the Corinthians, two hundred and twelve; of the Athenians, rather less than fifty. Putting out from the islands, the Athenians sailed the same day to Crommyon in the Corinthian territory, distant from the city one hundred and twenty stades, and having come to their moorings, ravaged the land, and passed the night there.

 The next day, having first coasted along to the Epidaurian territory and made a descent upon it, they came to Methone, which stands between Epidaurus and Troezen; and cutting off the isthmus of the peninsula in which Methone is situated, they fortified it, and having made it a post for a garrison, continued afterwards to lay waste the land of Troezen, Haliae, and Epidaurus. After cutting off this spot by a wall, they sailed back home with their ships. At the same time that these things were being done, Eurymedon and Sophocles, after weighing from Pylus for Sicily with an Athenian squadron, came to Corcyra, and with the Corcyraeans in the city carried on war upon those that had established themselves on Mount Istone, and who at that time, after crossing over subsequently to the insurrection, commanded the country, and were doing them much damage.

 They attacked their strong-hold and took it, but the men, having escaped in a body to a higher eminence, surrendered on condition of giving up their auxiliaries, and letting the Athenian people decide their own fate, after they had given up their arms. So the generals carried them across under truce to the island of Ptychia, to be kept in custody until they were sent to Athens;

 with an understanding that if any one were caught running away, the treaty would be void in the case of all.

 But the leaders of the popular party at Corcyra, fearing. that the Athenians might not put to death those that were sent to them, contrive the following stratagem.

 They persuade some few of the men in the island, by secretly sending friends to them, and instructing them to say, as though with a kind motive, that it was best for them to make their escape as quickly as possible, and that they would themselves get a vessel ready, for that the Athenian generals intended to give them up to the Corcyraean populace. So when they had persuaded them, and through their own arrangements about the vessel the men were caught sailing away, the treaty was declared void, and the whole party given up to the Corcyraeans.

 And the Athenian generals contributed no small share to such a result—that the pretext seemed strictly true, and its contrivers took it in hand more securely—by showing that they would not wish the men to be conveyed to Athens by another party, (they themselves being bound for Sicily,) and so to confer the honour on those who took them there.

 When the Corcyraeans had got possession of them, they shut them up in a large building, and afterwards taking them out by twenties, led them through two rows of heavy-armed soldiers posted on each side; the prisoners being bound together, and beaten and stabbed by the men ranged in the lines, wherever any of them happened to see a personal enemy; while men carrying whips went by their side, and hastened on the way those that were proceeding too slowly. As many as sixty men they took out in this manner, and put to death without the knowledge of those in the building; (for they supposed that they were taking them to be removed to some other place); but when they were aware of it, through some one's having pointed it out to them, they called on the Athenians, and desired that they would themselves put them to death, if they wished.

 They refused also any longer to leave the building, and said they would not, as far as they could prevent it, permit any one to come in. The Corcyraeans indeed were themselves not disposed to force a passage by the doors; but having gone up to the top of the building, and broken through the roof, they threw the tiles and discharged their arrows down on them.

 The prisoners sheltered themselves as well as they could, while at the same time the greater part were dispatching themselves, by thrusting into their throats the arrows which their enemies discharged, and hanging themselves with the cords from some beds that happened to be in the place, and by making strips from their clothes; and so in every manner during the greater part of the night, (for night came on while the tragedy was acting,) they were destroying themselves, and were dispatched with missiles by those on the roof.

 When it was day, the Corcyraeans threw them in layers on waggons, and carried them out of the city;

 while all the women that were taken in the building were reduced to slavery. In this way were the Corcyraeans of the mountain cut off by the commons; and the sedition, after raging so violently, came to this termination, at least, as far as the present war is concerned; for of one of the two parties there was nothing left worth mentioning.

 The Athenians then sailed away to Sicily, which was their original destination, and carried on the war with their allies there. At the close of the summer, the Athenians at Naupactus and the Acarnanians made an expedition, and took Anactorium, a city belonging to the Corinthians, which is situated at the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf, and was betrayed to them. And having turned out the Corinthians, Acarnanian settlers from all parts of the country themselves kept possession of the place. And so the summer ended. The following winter Aristides son of Archippus, a commander of the Athenian ships which had been sent out to the allies to levy contributions, arrested at Eion on the Strymon Artaphernes, a Persian, on his way from the king to Lacedaemon.

 On his being conveyed to Athens, they got his despatches translated out of the Assyrian character, and read them: the substance of which, as regarded the Lacedaemonians, (though many other things were mentioned in them,) was, that the king did not understand what they would have; for though many ambassadors had come to him, no one ever made the same statement as another; if then they would but speak plainly, they might send men to him in company with this Persian.

 The Athenians afterwards sent back Artaphernes in a trireme to Ephesus, and ambassadors with him; but on hearing there that king Artaxerxes, son of Xerxes, was lately dead, (for it was at that time that he died,) they returned home. The same winter also the Chians dismantled their new fortifications, at the command of the Athenians, and in consequence of their suspecting that they would form some new designs against them: they obtained, however, pledges from the Athenians, and security (as far as they could) for their making no change in their treatment of them. And so the winter ended and the seventh year of this war, of which Thucydides wrote the history. At the very commencement of the following summer, there was an eclipse of the sun at the time of a new moon, and in the early part of the same month an earthquake.

 Moreover, the exiles of the the Mytilenaeans and the other Lesbians, setting out most of them from the continent, and having taken into their pay an auxiliary force from the Peloponnese, and raised troops from the neighbourhood, took Rhoeteum, but restored it without injury on the receipt of 2000 Phocaean staters.

 After this they marched against Antandrus, and took the town through the treachery of the inhabitants. And their design was to liberate both the other

 i. e. situated on the ἀκτὴ, or coast, of Asia opposite to Lesbos. Actaean towns, as they were called—which the Athenians held, though formerly the Mytilenaeans owned them—and, above all, Antandrus; having fortified which, (for there were great facilities for building ships there, as there was a supply of timber, with Ida close at hand,) and sallying from it, as they easily might, with resources of every other kind, they purposed to ravage Lesbos, which lay near, and to subdue the Aeolian towns on the mainland. Such were the preparations which they meant to make. The Athenians in the same summer made an expedition against Cythera, with sixty ships, two thousand heavy-armed, and a few cavalry, taking with them also from amongst the allies the Milesians and some others; under the command of Nicias son of Niceratus, Nicostratus son of Diotreplles, and Autocles son of Tolmaeus.

 This Cythera is an island lying off Laconia, opposite to Malea. The inhabitants are Laconians, of the class of the perioeci, and an officer called the Judge of Cythera went over to the place annually. They also sent over regularly a garrison of heavy-armed, and paid great attention to it.

 For it was their landing-place for the merchantmen from Egypt and Libya; and at the same time privateers were less able to annoy Laconia from the sea, the only side on which it could be injured; for the whole of it runs out toward the Sicilian and Cretan seas. The Athenians therefore, having made the land with their armament, with ten of their ships and two thousand heavy-armed of the Milesians, took the town on the coast called Scandea; while with the rest of their forces they landed on the side of the island looking towards Malea, and advanced against the lower town of Cythera, and at once found all the inhabitants encamped there.

 A battle having been fought, the Cytherians stood their ground for some short time, and then turned and fled into the upper town; after which they came to an agreement with Nicias and his colleagues to throw themselves on the mercy of the Athenians, only stipulating that they should not be put to death.

 Indeed there had been before certain proposals made by Nicias to some of the Cytherians, in consequence of which the terms of the capitulation were settled more quickly and favourably, both for their present and future interests: else the Athenians would have expelled the Cytherians, both on the ground of their being Lacedaemonians and of the island being so adjacent to Laconia.

 After the capitulation, the Athenians, having got possession of Scandea, the town near the harbour, and appointed a garrison for Cythera, sailed to Asine, Helus, and most of the places on the sea; and making descents and passing the night on shore at such spots as were convenient, they continued ravaging the country about seven days. The Lacedaemonians, seeing the Athenians in possession of Cythera, and expecting them to make descents of this kind on their territory, no where opposed them with their collected forces, but sent about garrisons through the country, consisting of such numbers of heavy-armed as were required at the different places. And in other respects they were very cautious, fearing lest some innovation should be made in their constitution, in consequence of the unexpected and severe blow which had befallen them in the island, and of the occupation of Pylus and Cythera, and of their being surrounded on all sides by a war that was rapid and defied all precautions. So that, contrary to their custom, they raised four hundred horse and some bowmen;

 and now, if ever, they were decidedly more timid than usual in military matters, being engaged in a conflict opposed to the usual character of their forces, to be maintained at sea, and that against Athenians, by whom whatever they did not attempt was always regarded as a failure in their estimate of the success they should have.

 At the same time the events of fortune, many of which had in a short space of time happened contrary to their expectation, caused them the greatest dismay; and they were afraid that some disaster like that in the island might again, some time or other, happen to them.

 And for this reason they had less courage for fighting, and thought that whatever movement they made they should do wrong; because their minds had lost all assurance, owing to their former inexperience in misfortune. Accordingly, while the Athenians were at that time ravaging their sea-coast, whatever might be the garrison in the neighbourhood. of which each descent was made, generally speaking they kept quiet, thinking themselves in each case too few to resist them, and from their present state of feeling. And one garrison which did offer resistance about Cotyrta and Aphrodisia, though it terrified by an attack the scattered crowd of light-armed, yet retreated again, on its charge being sustained by the heavy-armed; and some few men belonging to it were killed, and some arms were taken; and the Athenians raised a trophy, and. then sailed back to Cythera.

 Thence they sailed round to the Limeran Epidaurus, and after laying waste some portion of the land, came to Thyrea, which forms a part of the Cynurian territory, as it is called, and is on the frontiers of Argos and Laconia. This district the Lacedaemonians, who owned it, gave to the Aeginetans, when expelled from their island, as a residence, for the service they had done them at the time of the earthquake and insurrection of the Helots, and because, though subject to Athens, they always stood on their side. While then the Athenians were yet sailing towards them, the Aeginetans evacuated the fortifications on the sea which they had happened to be building, and retreated to the upper town, in which they lived, at the distance of about ten states from the sea.

 And one of the garrisons in the country, which was also assisting them in the works, would not go with them within the wall, though the Aeginetans requested them; but thought it dangerous to be shut up within it; and so having retreated to the higher ground remained quiet, as they did not consider themselves a match for the enemy.

 In the mean time the Athenians landed, and advanced straightway with all their forces, and took Thyrea. The town they burnt down, and plundered the property in it, and took the Aeginetans with them to Athens, excepting those that had fallen in battle, and the Lacedaemonian commander who was amongst them, Tantalus the son of Patrocles; for he was taken prisoner after being wounded.

 They also took with them some few individuals from Cythera, whom they thought best to remove for security. These the Athenians determined to deposit in the islands; to order the rest of the Cytherians, while they retained their own country, to pay a tribute of four talents; to put to death all the Aeginetans that had been taken, for their former perpetual hostility; and to throw Tantalus into prison with the other Lacedaemonians taken in the island. The same summer, the inhabitants of Camarina and Gela in Sicily first made an armistice with one another; and then all the rest of the Sicilians also assembled at Gela, with embassies from all the cities, and held a conference together on the subject of a reconciliation. And many other opinions were expressed on both sides of the question, while they stated their differences and urged their claims, as they severally thought themselves injured; and Hermocrates son of Hermon, a Syracusan, the man who had the greatest influence with them, addressed the following words to the assembly: 

"It is not because I am of a city that is either the least powerful, or the most distressed by hostilities, that I shall address you, Sicilians, but in order publicly to state what appears to me the best policy for the whole of Sicily.

 And now with regard to war, to prove that it is a disastrous thing, why need one particularize all the evil involved in it, and so make a long speech before those who are acquainted with it? For no one is either driven to engage in it through ignorance, deterred From it fear, should he think that e will gain any advantage; but it is the lot of the former to imagine the gains greater than the dangers; and the latter will lace the perils rather than put up with any present loss.

 But if both should happen to be thus acting unseasonably, exhortations to peace would be useful And this would be most serviceable to us too at the present time, if we did but believe it.

 For it was surely with a purpose of well securing our own several interests that we both went to war at first, and are endeavouring by means of conference to come to terms again with each other; and if each one should not succeed in going away with what is fair, we shall proceed to hostilities again. 

"We should be convinced, however, that it is not for our own separate interests alone, if we are wise, that this congress will be held; but to consider whether we shall be able any longer to save the whole of Sicily, which, as I conceive, is the object of the machinations of the Athenians. And we should regard that people as much more compulsory mediators in such case than my words; who, possessing as they do the greatest power of all the Greeks, are watching our blunders, being here with a few ships; and under the legitimate name of alliance are speciously bringing to a profitable conclusion their natural hostility to us.

 For if we go to war, and call them in to our aid, men who of their own accord turn their arms even upon such as do not call them in; and if we injure ourselves by means of our own resources, and at the same time pave the way for their dominion: it is probable that when they observe us worn out, they will come hereafter with a great force, and endeavour to bring all these states into subjection to them. 

"And yet we ought, if we are wise, to aim at acquiring for our own respective countries what does not belong to them, rather than at diminishing what they already have, both in calling in allies and incurring fresh dangers; and to consider that faction is most ruinous to states, and particularly to Sicily, the inhabitants of which are all being plotted against, while we are at variance city with city.

 Knowing this then, we ought to make peace, individual with individual, and state with state, and to make a common effort to save the whole of Sicily: and the thought should be entertained by no one, that though the Dorian part of us are enemies of the Athenians, the Chalcidian race is secured by its Ionian connexion.

 For they are not attacking our nations, because they are different, and from their hatred of one of them; but from coveting the good things of Sicily, which we possess in common. And this they have now shown upon the invitation of the Chalcidian race:

 for to those who had never yet assisted them on the ground of their alliance, they themselves with forwardness answered their claim, beyond the letter of the compact. And very excusable is it that the Athenians should practise this covetousness and forecasting;

 and I blame not those who wish to reign, but those who are too ready to be subject. For human nature is always disposed to rule those that submit, but to guard against those that attack. And if any of us know this, but do not forecast as we ought, and if any one has come here without regarding it as his first care, that all should make a good arrangement for what is a general cause of alarm;

 we are mistaken in our views. Most speedily then should we be rid of that alarm by making peace with each other:

 for it is not from their own country that the Athenians set out against us, but from that of those who invited them here. And in this way war is not terminated by war, but our quarrels are ended without trouble by peace; and those who have been called in, having come with specious injustice, will go back with reasonable want of success. 

"With regard to the Athenians then, so great is found to be the benefit of our taking good advice.

 And with regard to peace, which is acknowledged by all to be a most excellent thing, how can it fail to be incumbent on us to conclude it amongst ourselves? Or do you think, that whatever good thing, or the contrary, any one has, quiet would not more effectually than war put a stop to the latter, and help to preserve the former; and that peace has not the less hazardous honours and splendours? with all other topics which one might discuss in many words, on such a subject as war. Considering then these things, you ought not to disregard what I say, but should rather provide each for your own safety in compliance with it.

 And if any one think that he shall certainly gain some advantage, either by right or might, let him not be annoyed by failure through the unexpected result; knowing that many men ere now, both while pursuing with vengeance those who have wronged them, and hoping, in other instances, to win an advantage by greater power, in the one case, so far from avenging themselves, have not even saved themselves; and in the other, instead of gaining more, have happened also to lose what they had.

 For vengeance is not necessarily successful, because a man is injured; nor is strength sure, because it is sanguine. But the incalculable nature of the future prevails to the greatest possible degree; and though the most. deceptive of all things, still proves the most useful: for because we are equally afraid, we are more cautious in attacking one another. 

"And now, on account of our indefinite fear of this unknown future, and our immediate dread of the Athenians' presence, being alarmed on both these grounds, and thinking, with regard to any failure in our ideas of what we severally thought to achieve, that these obstacles are a sufficient bar to their fulfilment, let us send away from the country the enemy that is amongst us, and ourselves make peace for ever, if possible; but if not that, let us make a treaty for the longest term we can, and put off our private differences to a future period.

 In a word, let us be convinced that by following my advice we shall each have a free city, from which we shall, as our own masters, make an equally good return to him who treats us either well or ill: but if, through not following it, we are subject to others, then, not to speak of avenging ourselves on any one, we necessarily become, even if most fortunate, friends to our greatest enemies, and at variance with those with whom we ought not to be so.